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OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTS WITH
UNOBSERVABLE INVESTMENTS
MARIO TIRELLI∗
Abstract. In this article we propose a security-design problem in which risk neutral
entrepreneurs make unobservable investment decisions while employing the investment
funds of risk-neutral outside investor/creditor(s). Contracts are restricted to satisfy limited
liability and monotonicity of the payment schedule. The model we present extends the
classical one proposed by Innes (1990, Journal of Economic Theory 52, 47-67) along three
main directions: agents’ decisions may be restricted by their initial capital and outside
ﬁnancial opportunities; their investment decisions may also consist in hiding funds in
an asset placed outside their ﬁrms; initial ﬁrms’ capital, which identiﬁes entrepreneur
types, may only be imperfectly observed by creditors (i.e. types are private information).
We motivate our interest in this security-design problem referring to the ‘opacity’ that
often characterizes the ﬁnancial situation and decisions of small ﬁrms, a particularly large
fraction of the non-ﬁnancial sector in most developed countries.
(JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D820, D860, G110, G320.)
(Keywords: Security design; asymmetric information; moral hazard; investment decisions;
debt contracts, collateral.)
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1. Introduction
Consider a competitive market or industry in which there is a single production activity
whose outcome (gross proﬁt) is uncertain. Each entrepreneur (or ﬁrm-owner) can increase
the likelihood of higher proﬁt realizations by investing in his ﬁrm. Investment raises ﬁrm’s
expected proﬁtability or productivity when, for example, it consists in R&D expenditure
and in expenditure on human capital formation or organization. The level of investment,
in turn, is aﬀected a) by the amount of the ﬁrm’s initial capital, b) by the entrepreneur’s
access to outside ﬁnance and c) by the value of an ‘outside option’, which (for simplicity)
in our analysis consists in an anonymous, safe deposit.
In this context, the our main goal is to characterize the eﬃcient menu of ﬁnancial contracts
and the implied optimal ﬁnancial and real investment decisions, when entrepreneurs (agents)
are risk-neutral and the regulator/principal faces the following restrictions:
• contracts must satisfy limited liability (LL), possibly, be subject to a monotonicity
condition of the payment schedule with respect to proﬁts (M), and yield no expected
losses to creditors (i.e. individual lenders participate - IP);
• entrepreneurs take investment decisions after ﬁnancial contracts are signed, but
before states of nature realize; investments, both in the ﬁrm and in an outside
deposit are unveriﬁable;
• creditors may be unable to observe ﬁrms’ initial capital (i.e. there may be asym-
metric information on agent types).
To characterize optimal contract we consider a principal-agent model that builds on the
classical one due to Innes (1990). It follows Innes in the assumption that agents’ actions
are unobservable and in some of the main restrictions on contracts. Instead, it diﬀers from
Innes’ in three relevant aspects. First, a real investment decision replaces an ‘eﬀort’ choice.
This implies that, in our context, an agent decision is subject to budget-feasibility, while in
Innes’ it is not and does only produce a subjective welfare cost. Second, entrepreneurs can
divert funds from productive investment and hide them outside their ﬁrms. Third, ﬁrms’
capital (net-worth), identifying entrepreneur types, is private information.
Given the presence of moral hazard and, possibly, of adverse selection, the space of
contracts we consider is multidimensional, consisting not only of a payment schedule, as
in Innes’, but also of a loan size and of an initial, down-payment. The down-payment can
assume diﬀerent forms conﬁguring, for example, a participation fee (e.g. in the spirit of
franchising), a security deposit (e.g. bank credit credit lines), a collateral requirement (e.g.
in secured credit card and bank credit lines) and a minimum capital requirement (e.g. a
minimum capital stock required by corporate law to public companies). Alternative forms of
this instrument have various impact on agents’ incentives and decisions. A third contractual
dimension is the loan size that may, possibly, be used to induce a dose of ‘credit rationing.’1
1Some path-breaking articles on the role of: a) collateral are Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) and Chan & Thakor
(1987); b) security (or bond) deposit is Lewis & Sappington (2000); c) franchise fee is Mathewson & Winter
(1984). Stigliz and Weiss cit. is also a classic of credit rationing.
1
In the context considered, our main results are gathered in a theorem and can be sum-
marized as follows. The menu of optimal contracts have the following characteristics:
1.i) A payment schedule of standard debt contracts (SDCs) if monotonicity is imposed;2
or live-or-die contracts (LDCs), otherwise;
1.ii) A loan size that induces no credit ‘rationing’ or ‘restriction’ to the agent;
1.iii) A down-payment in the form of maximal capital participation by the agent, if mono-
tonicity is imposed; or in the form of a full collateralization, otherwise;
1.iv) An interest rate schedule that is monotonically decreasing in the ﬁrm’s initial capital
and in its debt size, up to the point that ﬁnancial opportunities sustain the ﬁrst-best
(i.e. the level of investment that would be optimal in the absence of asymmetric
information).
Moreover, the optimal menu of contracts supports entrepreneurial policies with the following
characteristics:
2.i) The ﬁnancial structure of each ﬁrm is uniquely determined and is one in which ﬁrm’s
capital (net-worth) is the most preferred source of ﬁnance followed by outside debt:
if initial capital is suﬃcient to fund the ﬁrst-best level of individual investment, the
entrepreneur does not demand outside ﬁnance; otherwise, he subscribes a ﬁnancial
contract and reduces investments below the ﬁrst-best (i.e. the market incurs in
underinvestment);
2.ii) Entrepreneurs neither eﬀectively implement hidden saving nor (if feasible) have
incentive to pursue hidden borrowing;
2.iii) Entrepreneurs who operate higher capitalized ﬁrms invest more and borrow at a
lower implicit interest rate.
The fact that the optimal menu is composed of either SDCs or LDCs, depending on
whether or not monotonicity is assumed, conﬁrms Innes (1990) and is in line with most
of the theoretical literature.3 In the presence of moral hazard, these contracts reinforce
incentives to invest by redistributing most of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial cost from ‘good’ to ‘bad’
states (‘bankruptcy’ states).
Optimal contracts entail no credit ‘rationing’ or ‘restriction’ (in 1.ii). Moreover, although
the resulting investment projects are below the ﬁrst-best level (in 2.i), entrepreneurs neither
ﬁnd optimal to subscribe a loan of larger size, nor to try to secretly collect savings from
2SDCs are deﬁned as in Gale & Helwig (1985); Informally speaking, they are ﬁnancial contracts whose
payment schedule dictates a ﬁxed (non-contingent) payment for high enough, proﬁt realizations and a
‘default-payment’ (realized proﬁts + collateral) otherwise.
3Innes (1990) uses the reduced-form pioneered by Mirrlees (1976) and Holmstrom (1979). More recently,
an equivalent characterization has been obtained by Poblete & Spulber (2012) with a state-space approach.
Debt contracts are, in general, not optimal if the entrepreneur is risk averse. Though, even in this case an
initial debt contract is optimal, according to Matthews (2001), provided that it can be renegotiated after
the agent has chosen his level of eﬀort/investment, but before proﬁts are realized. Finally, debt contracts
are optimal in models of costly state veriﬁcation initiated by Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984), and Gale
and Hellwig (1985).
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other ﬁrms (2.ii).4 Indeed, we show that if an entrepreneur were to be oﬀered a contract
that makes such policies budget-feasible, he would ﬁnd optimal to renegotiate the contract
with a feasible one that is characterized by a lower size and a lower implicit interest rate
(by 1.iv). An analogous reasoning allows to explain why optimal contracts defeat hidden
savings and borrowing in 2.ii).
Optimal contracts prescribe full down-payment (in 1.iii). This can essentially be ex-
plained based on two considerations. First, the down-payment, either in the form of collat-
eral or of capital participation, allows to mitigate moral hazard by increasing the power of
the incentive scheme. In fact, in order to avoid the payment loss, occurring at low proﬁt
realizations, each agent tends to increase real investment; this, in turn, allows creditors to
oﬀer a loan contract with a lower interest rate, thereby sustaining incentives. Thus, even
if initial capital were common knowledge (essentially, as in Innes, cit.), optimal contracts
would prescribe full down-payment. The incentive eﬀects of collateral are consistent with
the ﬁndings of some contributions in the literature on banking and credit markets (see,
for example, Chan and Thakor, 1987), which however –to my knowledge- do not approach
the problem as a general one of security design.5 Second, when initial capital is private
information, collateral is an eﬃcient screening devise.6 In absence of any down-payment,
entrepreneurs with low capitalized ﬁrms would claim to have high capital in order to access
to contracts with a lower interest rate and a larger size (by 1.iv).7
The uniqueness of the ﬁrm ﬁnancial structure in 2.i), unsurprisingly, contrasts with tradi-
tional neoclassical theory of the ﬁrm and invalidates Modigliani-Miller theorem. Moreover,
the prescribed ﬁnancial structure is in line with a modern version of the pecking order
theory: when a ﬁrm experiences an imbalance of internal cash-ﬂow and real investment
opportunities, it resorts to external ﬁnance raising the debt-to-equity ratio. In other words,
rather than having in mind a static optimal debt-equity ratio, everything else equal, our
entrepreneurs adjust their ﬁnancial structure to the initial net-worth position and invest-
ment opportunities.8 In this paper debt is preferred to equity (i.e. to issue a participation
to the ﬁrm’s proﬁts) as debt produces a more powerful incentive scheme, supporting higher
4Unlike in this paper, it is sometimes the case in this literature that credit-rationing is identiﬁed with
underinvestment (e.g. Gale & Hellwig, 1985).
5For example, in Chan & Thakor. cit. the mechanism design problem restricts the space of contracts to that
of bank loans. Moreover, they assume that agents/borrowers have unlimited collateral that can be used to
ﬁnance an investment of exogenously ﬁxed amount.
6This is so, for example, in Gale & Hellwig (1985), where they consider initial capital as equity and they
ﬁnd optimal to have debt contracts with ‘maximum capital participation’.
7This view is not consistent with some contributions in the same literature, which highlight the adverse
selection eﬀects caused by higher collateral values (see, for example, Stiglitz and Weiss, cit.). However, in
Stiglitz & Weiss cit. collateral is added to contracts designed with respect to the interest rate alone; thus,
again contracts are not deﬁned as a solution of a general mechanism design problem.
8Although the goal of this paper is not matching empirical facts, the implied ﬁnancial structure is coherent
with (at least) part of the empirical evidence; see, for example, Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999). Yet there is
also evidence rejecting the empirical content of the pecking order theory; see, for example, Frank & Goyal
(2003) and the literature review therein.
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investments and ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts.9 Thus, although entrepreneurs would rather ﬁ-
nance investments through internal funds, a contract based on a combination of a SDC
and a minimum capital requirement can reproduce an eﬃcient equity-based compensation
scheme; a scheme that reduces agency costs and boosts ﬁrm investments (in 2.iii). The fact
that ﬁrms whose managers have high equity-based compensation schemes and high cash
ﬂow experience higher operating performance has recently been documented by Chen and
Chen (2017). Moreover, a consolidated empirical literature documents that companies with
sounder, initial wealth conditions tend to have access to better credit opportunities and
have higher likelihood of success in business.10
To our knowledge, the only paper that has investigated a security-design problem similar
to ours, with both moral hazard and asymmetric information on agents’ capital, is Lewis
and Sappington (2000).11 Yet, their focus and model diﬀer substantially from ours. First,
the problem they analyze is one of optimal delegation in which a principal, the owner of a
project, sicks to select one or more agents for its implementation; agents’ eﬀort and initial
wealth are unobservable to the principal. Our problem, instead, is one in which a regulator
(principal) designs ﬁnancial contracts that maximize the surplus generated by entrepreneurs
(agents) investments subject to the participation of a ﬁnancier (principal) conditional to
the speciﬁed information asymmetries.12 This distinction is not purely semantic: the intro-
duction of incentive-compatibility constraints makes the underline optimal design problems
non-concave; hence, the solution attained from its primal and dual formulations may not
just consist in a diﬀerent sharing rule of social surplus. Second, the model considered in
Lewis and Sappington is binomial; a project either success or fail. This restriction, in our
perspective, severely limits the possibility to distinguish between a SDC and more complex
forms of non-linear ﬁnancial agreements. Third, contrary to this paper, their agent-choice
model does not account for (hidden) ﬁnancial decisions; ex-post entering a contract, agents
only choose their eﬀort level (investment in our terminology). The option to divert cash
ﬂows is valuable under asymmetric information on initial wealth as it allows agents to select
contracts with higher loan size, designed for lower capitalized ﬁrms, and divert part of the
funds from the ﬁrm. Finally, the space of contracts we consider encompasses the one in
Lewis and Sappington’s. We argue later that the type of down-payments they consider
(the ‘up front bond’ payment in their language) is feasible for our designer but not optimal
when collateral can instead be required. This is again due to the fact that collateral has the
eﬀect of increasing the incentive to invest in the ﬁrm (i.e. impairing moral hazard), instead
9In more traditional models of pecking order theory (e.g., Myers & Majluf, 1984), equity is the most disfavor
mean of outside ﬁnance because it produces the worst form of adverse selection.
10The positive correlation between ﬁrms’ investment and their internal cash ﬂow has been documented in the
strand of empirical studies started by Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap, & Sharfstein
(1991), Gertler & Gilchrist (1994). See also see Hubbard, 1998 for an up to date review of this literature.
11See also Lewis & Sappington (2001) and the references therein.
12Apart from Innes (1990), our formulation is common to many other contributions in the literature on
optimal security design (see, for example, problem (2) in Gale & Hellwig, 1985). It is mostly natural under
perfect competition on ﬁnancial markets.
4
of just working as a screening device; something that, again, is in line with the literature
on banking and credit markets under asymmetric information (see, for example, Chan and
Thakor, 1987).
Another closely related work is De Marzo and Fishman (2006) that analyzes the invest-
ment problem of an agent under moral hazard, in a multi-period, dynamic setting. However,
their investment model diﬀers substantially from ours in that investment can exclusively
aﬀect the scale of a project. Instead, in our model investment modiﬁes the whole distribu-
tion of cash ﬂows. As we detail latter, in our setting higher investment level increases the
probability of higher proﬁt realizations, changing both the expected return to a project and
its risk. Apart from Innes cit., a speciﬁc model of ﬁrm decision like ours is presented, for
example, in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) and better captures situations in which invest-
ment aﬀects both a ﬁrm scale and productivity; this, we think, is much closer, in spirit, to
the neoclassical growth literature on R&D and on human capital.
Motivation. Beside a pure theoretical interest, our motives for extending a classical agency
model to hidden ﬁnancial decisions and unobservable ﬁnancial state/situation is the ‘opacity’
of small companies, which form a particularly large fraction of the non-ﬁnancial sector, in
most developed countries (see Kushnir et al., 2010). This ‘opacity’ is largely determined by
three factors: a very simpliﬁed governance, softer regulatory requirements on accounting and
transparency (information reporting), a low capitalization (e.g. see the discussion in Beger
and Udell, 1998). Indeed, small companies often take the form of a simple partnership
or are characterized by an elementary owner-manager structure, which makes harder for
outside investors to distinguish the ﬁnancial situation of a ﬁrm from the personal one of its
owners. Such problem is then worsen by a consolidated tendency of regulators to reduce
the administrative burden for small business. Even recently, a EU Directive (34/2013)13
has limited the amount of information required to an annual balance sheet and a proﬁt/loss
account, even with reference to companies with limited-liability. In addition, depending
on their dimension (small or micro ﬁrms), the Directive, allows EU Members to introduce
further signiﬁcative simpliﬁcations at national level.14 Similarly, in the US, small companies
are not required to release ﬁnancial information on 10K forms. Finally, small companies
(and, more generally, companies which are not publicly traded) are often less capitalized;
something that exacerbates agency costs. Clearly, opacity can be reduced by monitoring;
yet, especially for private companies (i.e. non-quoted on the stock market) monitoring
ﬁnancial positions is costly and sometimes impossible, especially because it is diﬃcult (or
impossible) to assess their cash management policies (e.g., see Gale and Hellwig, 1985).
As a partial evidence of the importance of asymmetric information and ﬁnancial frictions
on small ﬁrms’ policies, it has been documented that investment projects tend to be more
13The Directive is part of the Responsible Business package (see European Parliament, Directive
2013/34/EU).
14More speciﬁcally, EU Member State can require these ﬁrms to prepare only abridged balance sheets and
proﬁt/loss accounts, with a consistent reduction of ﬁnancial information.
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sensitive to cash-ﬂow and are, only residually, ﬁnanced with outside debt, mostly in the form
of bank credit. Such evidence is sharper for companies at their early stage and intensively
active in R&D. Moreover, asymmetric information seems to persist even in economies with
thick ﬁnancial markets, a well developed system of specialized intermediaries and venture
capitalists15. Finally, a number of studies suggests that ﬁrms not in their early stage,
who rely on bank credit, tend to establish long lasting relationship with one, or very few
counterparts, and to purchase a multiplicity of ﬁnancial services. These relationships allow
intermediaries to acquire ‘soft’ information on the kind of entrepreneurs they are dealing
with, including ‘ability’ or intrinsic ‘productivity’, that might not be easily veriﬁed (e.g.,
see Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Yet, for these ﬁrms asymmetries on ‘hard’ information,
including certain policies and actions, may be more relevant; something that reinforces the
interest for moral hazard.
Organization. The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and some pre-
liminary results. Section 3 deﬁnes the optimal mechanism-design problem and states our
theorem. The proof of the theorem is then split in two subsections in which, for expositional
reasons, we ﬁrst solve the optimal mechanism problem for the case of pure moral hazard
(i.e. assuming common knowledge of entrepreneur types). Then, we show that the menu
of optimal contracts obtained is incentive-compatible.
2. Basic structure and preliminary results
The model is one with a single consumption good, two time periods and uncertainty
over the second period. Agents are risk neutral entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur is the
single-owner of a ﬁrm and his type is determined by the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst period, endowment of
capital (net-worth) a in A := [a, a¯]. Initial net-worth is the consequence of an unrepresented
past and may both reﬂect the return of the entrepreneur’s past production and ﬁnancial
decisions.
In the ﬁrst period there is uncertainty on the outcome of each ﬁrm’s production activity,
which is represented by the realization of (gross) proﬁts, π in Π := [0,∞), occurring in
the second period. Although, proﬁt opportunities Π are equal across ﬁrms, their likelihood
depends on each entrepreneur’s investment choice, x ≥ 0. We, respectively, denote by
g(π|x) and G(π|x) the (conditional) density and the distribution functions of proﬁts for an
entrepreneur who has invested x.
The representation of the state space Π can also be used to identify speciﬁc ‘innovation
states’. We deﬁne an innovation state πs, as the threshold-proﬁt such that an increase of x
raises the probability of each and every π ≥ πs and reduces that of all π < πs. According
15See Hall & Lerner (2010) for an up-to-date survey on the empirical evidence, and Borisova & Brown (2013,
2015) for a more recent empirical test on the impact of ﬁnancing frictions on corporate investments.
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to this deﬁnition, 1 − G(πs|x) measures the probability that an entrepreneur, investing x,
successfully innovates.16
Throughout the paper the following assumptions will be maintained, unless diﬀerently
speciﬁed.
Assumption 1. The distributions g and G satisfy the following properties.
(1) g(π|x) and G(π|x) are twice continuously diﬀerentiable functions of x.
(2) Innovation requires investment, G(πs|0) = 1;
(3) Entrepreneur’s investment increases the likelihood of higher proﬁts; for all x,
∂
∂π
(
gx(π|x)
g(π|x)
)
is positive on Π and strictly positive for almost all (a.a.) π ≥ πs;
Property (3) is a monotone likelihood ratio condition (MLR) (Milgrom, 1981) and implies
that the class of distributions considered satisfy ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance over ﬁrms’
outcomes. By (3), investment increase the likelihood of innovation, Gx(π|x) ≤ 0, for all
π > 0, holding with strict inequality at a.a. π ≤ πs.
An additional, technical assumption is the convexity of the distribution function:
Assumption 2. For all (x, z) > 0,
∫∞
z g(π|x)dπ = 1−G(z|x) is strictly convex in x.
This assumption prescribes a form of stochastic diminishing return to scale in investment,
Gxx(z|x) ≤ 0 for all (x, z) > 0. It is common in the moral hazard literature, as it makes
possible to exploit the ‘ﬁrst-order approach’ (see Rogerson, 1985). Conditional distributions
satisfying the two assumptions and, particularly, MLR and convexity, can be found in the
class of bivariate exponential, often used in applications.17
Financial contracts. A ﬁnancial contract l in L is characterized by a triplet (Bl,P l, αl).
Namely, an amount of funds (or loan size) Bl ≥ 0; a down-payment, in the form of a fraction
0 ≤ αl ≤ 1 of the initial capital of the counterpart, which is secured in a safe deposit with
return R > 0; a payment schedule P l is a function of the ﬁrm’s veriﬁable net-worth, given
by the ﬁrm’s proﬁts π and the down-payment. We further restrict contracts by assuming
that P l: (a) is piecewise smooth and right diﬀerentiable on Π; (b) satisﬁes limited liability;
namely, for all π in Π, and l in L,
(LL) 0 ≤ P l ≤ π + αlalR
The upper bound in (LL) is often motivated by legal provisions, or by the ability of the
entrepreneurs (especially in small business) to hide funds and other sources of income.
Instead, 0 ≤ P l establishes that creditors’ liability is limited by the loan oﬀered to the ﬁrm
16The identiﬁcation of one, or more, of such innovation-states is only for expositional reasons and can be
removed without altering any of our results.
17For example, 1−G(z|x) = a(bcx+ 1) exp[−za(bcx+ 1)], (a, b, c) > 0, z > 0, known as Arnold & Strauss
(1988) model.
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(i.e. in the worse possible scenario, a creditor looses the amount of the loan). This excludes
contracts in which the ﬁnancier buys equity rights from the entrepreneur, which she may
eventually waive, transfer back or loose.18
Up-front payments are secured in a bank deposit and, unless some form of conﬁscation is
prescribed by the contract, they remain a ﬁrm’s property. Conﬁscation may occur, according
to (LL), either unconditionally or conditionally to some future states. In the ﬁrst case, we
have contracts such as those prescribing a participation (or franchise) fee; in the second case
we have contracts such as collateralized loans, for which conﬁscation occurs, for example,
in ‘bankruptcy states’ (states with ‘particularly’ low proﬁt realizations).
We say that a ﬁnancial contract l in L is a standard debt contract (SDC), in the sense of
Gale & Hellwig (1985), if there exists a state zl in Π such that, for all π > zl, some constant
payment is required; while, for all states π ≤ zl, a ‘maximum payment’ is required to the
ﬁrm; this, in our context, correspond to the observable ﬁrm’s assets, that is, ﬁrms’ realized
proﬁt and the down-payment. Thus, in this respect, when π ≤ zl we have the equivalent of
what are usually called ‘bankruptcy states’. More formally,
(SDC) P l =
{
zl, for all π > zl
π + αlaR, for all π ≤ zl
A ﬁnancial contract l in L is a live-or-die (LDC) in the sense of Innes (1990), if at all π > zl,
a zero payment is required,
(LDC) P l =
{
0, for all π > zl
π + αlaR, for all π ≤ zl
A ﬁnancial contract l in L is monotone (M) if the payment schedule is non-decreasing.
Monotonicity has been explained as a way to prevent situations in which proﬁts are strate-
gically ‘manipulated’. For example, an agent who can ex-post access to (hidden) borrowing
or saving can ﬁctitiously increase proﬁts so as to escape bankruptcy and the consequent
loss of collateral. Similarly, in the absence of (M), a creditor might ﬁnd convenient to claim
lower (or to ‘sabotage’) proﬁts, so as to conﬁscate collateral.19 Perhaps, the most relevant
reason to impose monotonicity is that this property is simply observed in most real-world
contracts.
Clearly, collateralized SDCs and LDCs, above, are both examples of contracts violating
(M) (for SDC, see the dashed line in ﬁgure 1). Monotonicity is restored for collateralized
SDCs if they prescribe to pay P l = zl + αlalR, at all states π ≥ zl; and the new contract
has a payment schedule that replicates the typical SDC deﬁned in the literature (SDC +
(M) in ﬁgure 1). However, imposing monotonicity has the eﬀect to make the down-payment
equivalent to a requirement of maximal capital participation by the agent.
The principal ﬁnances every contract, contextually, collecting deposits (i.e. borrowing)
at the market interest rate R. He participates in a contract l ﬁnancing an investment x if
18An equity contract of this type and size κl imposes a LL on the side of the ﬁnancier, −κl ≤ minπ P l.
19See, also the discussion in Innes (1990), p.50.
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Figure 1. Contracts with full down-payment (α = 1)
and only if,
(IP)
∫
P lg(π|x)dπ −RBl ≥ 0
Later, we shall often refer to the (implicit) interest rate of a contract l; by this we simply
the average payment,
∫
P lg(π|x)dπ/Bl.
Entrepreneurs (agents). For every contract l, a project of an entrepreneur of type a, is
characterized by a plan (a′, x) that solves,
max
(a′,x)∈R2+
E[V (a′, x;π, a, l)|x] :=(F(l, a))
=
{∫
[π − P l]g(π|x)dπ + αlaR+Ra′ : a′ + x ≤ Bl + (1− αl)a
}
More precisely, we shall denote the project of a associated to contract l,(
a′(l, a), x(l, a)
)
Implicit in this formulation is that ﬁrms cannot monitor other ﬁrms and that putting
money into a safe deposit is the only feasible ﬁnancial investment. Also, in line with the
ﬁnance literature, we interpret the entrepreneur’s decision to set a′ = 0 as one in which he
commits to maximal equity ﬁnancing of a risky investment x. Indeed, a′ > 0 occurs if the
entrepreneur uses part of his assets for a ﬁnancial investment, which, only for simplicity, we
assumed to be the safe deposit with return R.
We say that entrepreneur a is willing to participate to a (non-trivial) contract l (i.e. with
Bl > 0) if for some x and a
′ it yields an higher expected proﬁts than implementing any
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other budget-feasible project (a˜′, x˜) with self-ﬁnancing. The following assumption ensures
that investment decisions x are interior.
Assumption 3. For every contract l in L to which entrepreneur a in A would participate,
∂
∂x
E[V (a′, x;π, a, l)|x] > 0
at (a′, x) = (Bl + a(1− αl), 0).
Remark 2.1 (On SDCs: collateral versus equity). Observe that, by deﬁnition of, the en-
trepreneur’s problem, under a collateralized SDC, expected proﬁts take the form:∫
[π − P l]g(π|x)dπ + αlaR+Ra′ =
∫ ∞
zl
[π − zl]g(π|x)dπ +R [a(1− αl1π≤zl) +Bl − x]
This clariﬁes why we deﬁne such contracts ‘collateralized’ SDC: contracts which impose
the payment of realized proﬁts and collateral in ‘bankruptcy’ states (when π ≤ zl and the
indicator function 1π≤zl equals 1) and a ﬁxed payment zl, otherwise.
SDC with capital participation are instead standard debt contracts which require the en-
trepreneur deposits a fraction αl of the ﬁrm existing assets to the ﬁnancier; although he
fully maintains the control rights of the ﬁrm (i.e. he remains the only one entitled to receive
the ﬁrm’s net proﬁts). Such contracts emerge when collateralized SDC are required to be
monotone and satisfy (M) (see SDC+(M) in ﬁgure 1).
Some preliminary results.
Lemma 1 (Investment). Assume that G is a continuous distribution. Then, for every
entrepreneur of type a in A, contract l in L and investment x, such that (IP) holds, a
solution to F(l, a) exists. Moreover, under assumption 2, the solution is unique if contracts
are either SDCs or LDCs. Moreover, under assumption 3, x > 0.
Proof. The ﬁrst part is the result of the objective function being continuous and bounded
on a compact domain of the choice variables. By (IP ) and (LL), RBl ≤ E[P l|x] ≤ E[π|x] <
∞.20 Individual budget constraint implies that 0 ≤ a′ ≤ a+B − x ≤ a+B < ∞. Thus,
E[V (a′, x;π, t, l)|x] ≤ E[π|x] +Ra′ < ∞
Hence, by continuity, the objective is bounded from above. It is also bounded from below
by the return from inaction, Ra. Therefore, existence of a solution follows from Weierstrass
Theorem. Uniqueness holds for both SDCs and LDCs under assumption 2 and LL. 
Under assumption 1(1) and 2 we can characterize a project (a′, x) in (a′(l, a), x(l, a)),
as the pair of continuous functions that satisfy the following condition: whenever a′ =
Bl + (1− α)a− x > 0,
∂
∂x
E[V (a′, x;π, a, l)|x)] = 0(x)
20Hereafter, expectations are all computed with respect to the densities g.
10
Let E [V (a′, x;π, a,R)|x)] denote the expected proﬁts of a typical entrepreneur who can
borrow/save at the risk-free rate R. As we argue later, this contract is the optimal one
in the absence of information asymmetries, hence it is hereafter addressed as the ﬁrst-best
contract. The following lemma deﬁnes the ﬁrst-best level of investment.
Lemma 2 (Investment eﬃciency). Under assumption 1(1) and 2, for all a in A, there
exists a unique eﬃcient (ﬁrst-best) investment x∗,
∂
∂x
E
[
V (a′, x;π, a,R)|x)] = 0
Finally, to focus on situations in which outside ﬁnancing is demanded by a non-negligible
portion of entrepreneurs, we assume that a ‘large’ fraction of them would not be able to
implement their projects without borrowing (i.e. choosing to subscribe the null contract
l = 0). This is summarized in the following assumption.
Assumption 4. There is an open interval A′ of A such that, for all a in A′, at a solution
(a′, x) to F(0, a),
∂
∂x
E
[
V (a′, x;π, a, 0)|x)] > 0
Throughout the rest of the paper we shall redeﬁne the type space A as equal to A′.
3. Optimal financial contracts
We deﬁne and characterize optimal contracts and analyze entrepreneurial policy decisions,
assuming that: i) before contracting, each agent type sends a message concerning his type
a and project (a′, x); ii) once a contract l is signed, each agent chooses the project to
implement; iii) proﬁt realizations are publicly observed after projects have been ﬁnalized.
Contracts and entrepreneurial policies are deﬁned based on a revelation mechanism, which
establishes a sharing-rule over the veriﬁable outcome of projects and ﬁrm net-worth.
Deﬁnition 1 (Mechanism M). A mechanism in M is:
i) a set of messages M ⊂ A × R2+, of typical element m = (a, a′, x), that each en-
trepreneur can send to the principal,
ii) a proﬁle of outcome functions M → L×R2+ whose values identify a feasible contract
l in L and an actual implementation of the the project, (a′(m), x(m)); where a
contract l in L identiﬁes a triplet (P l(m), Bl(m), αl(m)) deﬁned above.
M is a direct-mechanism if for each type a˜ in A, the message sent is truthful, m ≡
(a˜, a˜′, x˜), l(m) ≡ a˜ and the announced project is implemented, (a′(m), x(m)) ≡ (a′(a˜), x(a˜)).
Deﬁnition 2 (Optimal mechanism). An optimal mechanism is a direct-mechanism in
M such that, for every entrepreneur of type a, each value of the outcome functions (l, a′, x)
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solves problem P:
max
(l,(a′,x))∈(L,R2+)
E[V (a′, x;π, a, l)|x] s.t.
(l, a′, x) ∈ arg max
{l¯,a¯′,x¯}
E[V (a¯′, x¯;π, a, l¯)|x¯](CC)
E[P l|x]−RBl ≥ 0(IP)
(CC) is both a commitment and an incentive-compatibility constraint ensuring that the
agent does not deviate with respect to the project (a′, x) and spontaneously subscribes the
contract designed for his type.
Therefore, we deﬁne the menu of optimal contracts and optimal entrepreneurial policies as
the outcomes of our optimal, direct mechanism. Restricting to direct-mechanism is without
loss of generality and follows from a standard application of the Revelation Principle.
Theorem. Let assumptions 1 through 4 hold. The menu of optimal contracts in L and
optimal entrepreneurial policies is the outcome of a direct mechanism in M such that, for
all a in A,
(1) entrepreneur a subscribes a ﬁnancial contract l (≡ a) that i) if monotonicity (M) is
assumed, takes the form of a SDC with maximal capital participation of the agent,
αla = a, or ii) if (M) is not assumed, takes the form of a LDC with ‘full collateral’,
αla = a;
(2) contract l brakes even (i.e. (IP) holds with equality);
(3) entrepreneur a chooses an ineﬃcient investment project, 0 < x(l, a) ≤ x∗, with
strict inequality if (CC) binds;
(4) entrepreneur a does neither resort to hidden saving nor to hidden borrowing
(a′(l, a) = 0 is non-binding).
For expositional reasons, it is useful to, ﬁrst, deal with the case in which types are
common knowledge (i.e. the case of ‘pure moral hazard’) and then to introduce asymmetric
information on types. This will be, respectively, done in the next two subsections in which
proposition 1 and 2 will be established. The proof of our theorem follows directly from
these propositions.
3.1. Pure moral hazard. When a type a becomes common knowledge before contracting,
the message space M is reduced to entrepreneur a projects and P is redeﬁned simply by
substituting (IC) with,
(a′, x) ∈ argmaxE[V (a′, x;π, a, l)|x](CC)
which, in our language, is the commitment-constraint (CC).
For notational simplicity, in the rest of this section, we shall drop all the indices that are
unnecessary, namely the entrepreneur’s type a, and the index of contracts, l.
Proposition 1. The menu of optimal contracts in L and optimal entrepreneurial policies
is such that, for each entrepreneur a, properties (1)-(4) in the theorem hold.
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We denote by L∗ the menu of optimal contracts.
To prove this result, consider the Lagrangian of problem P, in which (M) is dropped,
budget-balance is used to eliminate a′ and (CC) is substituted with,
(CC’)
∂
∂x
E[V |x] ≡
∫
[π − P ]gx(π|x)dπ −R ≥ 0
Also, restrict to no hidden-borrowing, assume a′ ≥ 0, and denote the candidate multipliers
by (ψ, γ, μ, η, θ, ξ, ζ),
max
x,P,B,α
∫
[π − P ]g(π|x)dπ + αaR+ (1 + ψ)R [(1− α)a+B − x] +
+ γ
[∫
P g(π|x)dπ −RB
]
+
+ μ
[∫
[π − P ]gx(π|x)dπ −R
]
+
+
∫
η(π)[π + αaR− P ]g(π|x)dπ +
∫
θ(π)P g(π|x)dπ+
+ ξBR+ ζ0αaR+ ζ1(1− α)aR
Necessary conditions for optimality are:
x :
∂
∂x
E[V |x] + γ
∫
P gx(π|x)dπ + μ ∂
2
∂x2
E[V |x]− ψR = 0,(f1)
ψ : ψ ≥ 0, ψ [(1− α)a+B − x] = 0
P : g(π|x)
{
−1 + γ − μgx(π|x)
g(π|x) − [η(π)− θ(π)]
}
= 0, for all π(f2)
B, ξ : 1 + ψ − γ + ξ = 0, ξ ≥ 0, ξB = 0(f3)
α, ζ : 1− (1 + ψ) +
∫
η(π)g(π|x)dπ = ζ1 − ζ0, ζ0, ζ1 ≥ 0, ζ0α = 0, ζ1(1− α) = 0.(f4)
Like in Innes (1990), risk-neutrality implies that the problem is linear in P . Let
ϕ(π, x, ·) := −1 + γ − μgx(π|x)g(π|x) − [η(π)− θ(π)]; then, for any given α, the optimal payment
schedule satisﬁes the following,
ϕ(π, x, ·) > 0 only if P = π + αa, η(π) ≥ 0, θ(π) = 0
ϕ(π, x, ·) = 0 only if P ∈ [0, π + αa], η(π) ≥ 0, θ(π) ≥ 0
ϕ(π, x, ·) < 0 only if P = 0, η(π) = 0, θ(π) ≥ 0
The proof of proposition 1 follows from four lemmas that are presented next.
Proof of proposition 1.
Lemma 3. For any non-trivial contract in L∗ with a non-binding commitment constraint
(CC’), properties (1)-(3) in the theorem hold, with the investment level equal to x∗. a′ ≥ 0
is non-binding.
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Proof. We aim at showing that, at a solution, μ = 0 implies γ > 0 (precisely, γ = 1)
and ψ = 0. First, since a ﬁrst-best entails a non-contingent payment R, we claim that,
w.l.o.g., B = x − a > 0 and α = 0. This, by complementary slackness, implies ξ = 0.
(f3) implies γ ≥ 1 + ψ ≥ 1. Next, we show that γ ≤ 1. By contradiction, suppose γ > 1,
then P = π binding at all π occurring with positive probability; otherwise, η(π) = 0 would
imply ϕ(π, x, ·) = −1+γ+ θ(π) > 0, contradicting (f2). However, P = π at all π occurring
with positive probability violates (CC’). Indeed, if P = π at all π, ∂∂xE[V |x] = −R < 0.
Therefore, we conclude that μ = 0 implies γ = 1.
By complementary slackness, γ = 1 > 0 implies that (IP) holds with equality.
Next, μ = 0 and γ = 1, by (f3), imply that ψ = 0 (at B > 0).
Finally, μ = 0, γ = 1 and (f1) imply that,
0 =
∂
∂x
E[V |x] +
∫
P gx(π|x)dπ =
∫
πgx(π|x)dπ −R
Hence, x = x∗. (CC) holds by Assumption 3. Clearly, in this case, there is some indetermi-
nacy of the mechanism at the ﬁrst-best: a mechanism with payment R, size B = x−a, α = 0
and a′ = 0 is equivalent to one with -same uncontingent payment- loan size B′ = a′+B+αa,
0 < α ≤ 1 and a′ 	= 0. 
Lemma 4. For any non-trivial contract in L∗ with a binding commitment constraint (CC’),
properties (1)-(3) in the theorem hold and a′ ≥ 0 is non-binding.
Proof. We proceed in steps.
Step 1: A solution satisﬁes (IP) with equality.
(f3) implies γ = 1 + ψ > 0. By complementary slackness (IP) binds.
Step 2: A solution satisﬁes (CC’) with equality.
From μ > 0 and complementary slackness, 0 = ∂∂xE[V |x].
Step 3: A solution is a LD contract.
μ > 0 and MLR imply that ϕ(π, x, ·) is decreasing in π, strictly decreasing for some π ≥ πs.
Moreover ϕ(π, x, ·) ≥ 0 at some π occurring with positive probability, otherwise P = 0
would be chosen violating (IP). Moreover, we know that, generically, a solution satisﬁes
ϕ(π, x, ·) > 0 at some π. Also, (CC’) implies that we cannot have P = π + αa at all π
and thus, at a solution, it must be that ϕ(π, x, ·) ≤ 0 at some π. By continuity and the
Intermediate Value Thm., we conclude that there exists a z ≥ πs > 0 such that ϕ(π, x, ·) = 0.
The fact that z ≥ πs follows from Step 1, γ ≥ 1. Moreover, z is unique by strict monotonicity
of gx/g on [πs,∞). The optimal payment schedule is typical of a LDC, in the sense of Innes
(1990),
P =
{
0, π > z
π + αaR otherwise
Step 4: We now show that, because at a solution
∫
P gx(π|x)dπ > 0, the solution is
ineﬃcient, 0 < x < x∗, and satisﬁes (CC) with a non-binding constraint a′ ≥ 0.
First, because (CC’) binds (μ > 0), 0 = ∂∂xEV [π|x] is a necessary optimality condition for
14
the agent at a non-binding constraint a′ ≥ 0; implying ψ = 0. Moreover,
0 =
∂
∂x
E[V |x](o)
=
∂
∂x
[∫
[π − P ]g(π|x)dπ] + αaR+R(B + a(1− α)− x)
]
=
∂
∂x
∫
[π −Rx]g(π|x)dπ −
∫
P gx(π|x)dπ
Using, 0 = ∂∂xE[V |x], γ = 1, ψ = 0, (f1) reads,
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x] = − 1
μ
∫
P gx(π|x)dπ < 0
with the latest inequality following from assumption 2 and μ > 0. Using,
∫
P gx(π|x)dπ > 0
in (o), one ﬁnds,
(∗) ∂
∂x
∫
[π −Rx]g(π|x)dπ > 0
As (CC’) holds with equality, a solution x satisﬁes necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
individual optimality (CC), with a non-binding constraint a′ ≥ 0. Finally, by assumption
2,
∫
[π−R]g(π|x)dπ is strictly concave in x; hence, (∗) implies x < x∗. 0 < x follows from
assumption 3.
Step 5: Full collateralized LDC contracts.
For any non-trivial contract, we have seen that, ξ = 0 = ψ, γ = 1, irrespectively of μ ≥ 0.
Hence, (f4) reduces to,
(f4’)
∫
η(π)g(π|x)dπ = ζ1 − ζ0  0
which, respectively, implies an optimal presciption: α = 1 if lhs > 0, α ∈ [0, 1] if lhs = 0
and α = 0 if lhs < 0. Next, integrating (f2) on Π,∫
[η(π)− θ(π)]g(π|x)dπ = γ − 1 = 0
Since, by (f2), θ(π) ≥ 0 holds strictly at some π, occurring with positive probability, we
conclude that a solution of P yields ζ1 > 0 = ζ0 and, by complementary slackness, it delivers
α = 1. 
Lemma 5. In the context of our theorem, restrict contracts to have a monotone payment
schedule (M). Then, any non-trivial solution to P is a SDC such that properties (1)-(3)
stated in the theorem hold.
Proof. The proof reiterates the ones given for lemma 3 and 4. It is immediate to verify that
the only diﬀerence is for the latest lemma, when it comes to the deﬁnition of the payment
schedule P (·), for which (M) dictates, P = z + aR, for all π > z. This pins down the
optimal SDC. 
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The following establishes property (4) in the theorem.
Lemma 6. In the context of our theorem, any optimal ﬁnancial contract l in L∗ entails no
hidden ﬁnancial decisions.
The fact that an optimal contract does not produce hidden borrowing follows directly
from lemma 3. Thus, we are left to prove that a solution to P does never entail hidden
saving. This proof, we shall give next, has an intuitive argument. Indeed, reasoning by
contradiction, suppose that a solution to P is a contract of size B such that the agent ﬁnds
feasible and rewarding to save a′ > 0. There exists an alternative contract with a lower
size B˜ and a lower cost z˜ such that, if subscribed by the agent, would ﬁnance a project
characterized by a higher real investment x˜ and a lower saving a˜′. Indeed, if the agent, at
the optimal contract, were indiﬀerent between investing in the real asset and in the hidden
deposit, now a reduction of the interest rate on outside ﬁnancing (given R) makes proﬁtable
for him to increase the ﬁrst and reduce the second. Thus, a contradiction to optimality is
attained.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose that an optimal SDC, (B, z), entails a′ > 0. Let us
marginally reduce B and increase x: dx = −dB > 0,  > 0 arbitrarily small. This is
feasible if da′ = dB − dx = dB(1 + ), and if it satisﬁes (IP ). (IP ) holds if,(
∂
∂z
E[P |x]
)
dz
dB
+
(∫
P gx(π|x)dπ
)
dx
dB
−R = 0
where, under (M), ∂∂zE[P |x] :=
∫∞
z g(π|x)dπ > 0.21 Or, equivalently,
dz
dB
=
R+
(∫
P gx(π|x)dπ
)

∂
∂zE[P |x]
()
whose rhs, evaluated at an optimal contract, is positive. Next, totally diﬀerentiating the
agent’s objective,
dE[V |x] = −
(
∂
∂z
E[P |x]
)
dz +
(
∂
∂x
E[V |x]
)
dx+RdB
which, evaluated at the optimal contract (entailing ∂∂xE[V |x] = 0), reduces to,
dE[V |x]
dB
= −
(
∂
∂z
E[P |x]
)
dz
dB
+R
Using (),
dE[V |x]
dB
= −
(
∂
∂z
E[P |x]
)[
R+
(∫
P gx(π|x)dπ
)

∂
∂zE[P |x]
]
+R
= −
(∫
P gx(π|x)dπ
)
 < 0
21Notice that d
dz
DxE[P |x] :=
∫∞
z
gxdπ > 0, because gx > 0 for a.a. π ≥ z ≥ πs, by assumption 1.
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for any  > 0. It remains to check that (CC’) continues to hold, for at least some  > 0. At
the initial, optimal contract, (CC’) holds if,
−
(
∂
∂z
DxE[P |x]
)
dz +
(
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x]
)
dx ≥ 0
where, under (M) (i.e. for collateralized SDCs), ∂∂zDxE[P |x] :=
∫∞
z gx(π|x)dπ. Using this
to determine :
 ≡ − dx
dB
≥
(
∂
∂zDxE[P |x]
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x]
)
dz
dB
By (), dz/dB > 0 implying that the right hand side of the latter expression is negative,
when evaluated at the initial optimal contract. Therefore, (CC’) holds for all  > 0. To
sum up, a marginal reduction of the loan size, accompanied with a feasible adjustment of
z (decreasing) and x (increasing) improves the agent’s welfare; which provides the desired
contradiction. As the initial contract delivering a′ > 0, was arbitrary, this concludes our
proof. It is straightforward to reiterate the argument for the case of a LDC. 
Finally, it is important to remark that the above lemmata can be restated and proved
for the case in which L is restricted to admit only contracts that do not allow for down-
payments. If we denote this subset of contracts by L0, it is then straightforward to verify
that the following corollary of our theorem holds.
Corollary 1. The menu of optimal contracts in L0 and optimal entrepreneurial policies is
such that, for each entrepreneur a, properties (1)-(4) in the theorem hold.
3.2. Discussion.
On the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy . Which are the speciﬁc characteristics of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
structure under optimal contracts? Our theorem says that an optimal mechanism is a loan
contract whose size exactly matches the agent’s demand of credit. Hence, we can conclude
that if the agent were allowed to secretly borrow at the same contract (or issuing a bond
at a ﬁxed market rate R) after the optimal ﬁnancial contract is signed, he would not do so.
Moreover, the fact that the entrepreneur does not use part of the loan to build up (hidden)
savings, conﬁrms the idea that the entrepreneurs’ demand of outside funds is somewhat
residual, equal to that fraction of projects that they cannot cover by internal sources.
Is the optimal ﬁnancial contract unique? Answering this question is relevant to assess
if the ﬁnancial structure of the ﬁrm matters. In standard neoclassical theory of the ﬁrm,
Modigliani-Miller’s theorem holds: regardless ﬁnancial markets are complete or incomplete,
the ﬁnancial structure of the ﬁrm is indeterminate. In our model instead, the optimal
ﬁnancial structure of the ﬁrm is unique. Indeed, we have deﬁned an optimal contract
as one in which the entrepreneur ﬁnds individually optimal to commit to his announced
project (a′, x). We have also established that, at any optimal contract, the ﬁrm’s second-
order-condition holds with strict inequality (by assumption 2 and lemma 3), hence (a′, x) is
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unique and so is the threshold z. Finally, since at a solution to P, the entrepreneur budget
balances, the loan size is also uniquely determined, B = x (recall that a′ = 0 and α = 1).
The relevance of hidden saving . Let us assume that an entrepreneur’s saving a′ is veriﬁable
(i.e. it cannot be hidden). Then, omitting down-payments, ﬁnancial contracts can be
written contingently on,
w(a′) := π +Ra′
Consequently, the entrepreneur saving decision becomes indeterminate and can be disre-
garded. Indeed, it is easy to verify that every optimal contract l in L takes again the form
of a LDC. Precisely, if z is unique, for a type a, with actions (a′, x) in (a′(l, a), x(l, a)), the
payment schedule of l is,
P l(w(a
′)) =
{
0, w(a′) ≥ z
w(a′) otherwise
and RBl = E[Pl(w)|x]. Therefore, (IP) holds also at (Bl − a′) and P l, implying that
entrepreneur t is indiﬀerent between (a′, x, Bl,P l(w)) and (0, x, Bl − a′,P l).
To summarize, whenever contracts can also be written on saving, saving decisions become
redundant/indeterminate and, in absence of private information, the whole analysis falls
back into Innes’ (1990).
Down-payments improve incentives. Let us go back to Innes’s (1990). Even if we elimi-
nate the possibility of hidden savings/borrowing, an optimal mechanism prescribes maxi-
mum down-payment. Restrict contracts to have a security deposit that is unconditionally
returned to the ﬁrm in the next period; or, alternatively, a down-payment that is non-
refundable (e.g. a non-refundable capital participation, or a franchise fee). In this new
setting the size and nature of the down-payment is indeterminate, as the principal can
always neutralize them by adjusting the debt size, when necessary.22 These types of con-
tracts are clearly feasible in our model, as the principal can always implement them by,
respectively, choosing P ≤ π and P ≤ π + αa, at all π. Yet, based on our theorem, we
conjecture that (unless the ﬁrst-best is implementable) contracts with a down-payment are
‘preferred’ or more eﬃcient, because they strengthen agents’ incentives to invest; something
that is ultimately due to the fact that down payments allow to relax the limited liability
constraint.
To further understand why down-payment can implement more powerful incentive
scheme, we next argue that, at an optimal mechanism with entrepreneur a investing x′,
any alternative contract in L, with either no down payment or a full security deposit,23
supporting x′, carries ‘weaker incentives’ (i.e. induces a to choose x < x′). More precisely,
suppose that an entrepreneur of type a subscribes a collateralized LDC (B′, z′, 1) in L∗,
22Again, this is trivially so by the uncontingent nature of the payments and hold inasmuch agents do not
suﬀer of credit rationing.
23By security deposit we mean that the up-front payment is returned to the ﬁrm unconditionally.
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supporting a project, x′, and x′ = B′. Consider a LDC with no down payment (B, z, 0)
supporting the same project x′ = B′ = B with (IP) holding with equality.
Claim 1: Collateralized LDC deliver stronger incentives: z′ < z.
The best contract LDC with no down-payment, in the eyes of the entrepreneur, is one that
makes (IP) hold with equality. So assume that,∫ z
0
πg(π|x′)dπ = RB′
Combined with the (IP) holding with equality at the optimal collateralized contract, yields,∫ z′
0
πg(π|x′)dπ +RaG(z′|x′) = RB′ =
∫ z
0
πg(π|x′)dπ
The latest is satisﬁed if and only if z′ < z.
Claim 2: Consider the same two contracts above, (B′, z′, 1), (B, z, 0) with z′ < z. Although
x′ is feasible under the contract with no down-payment the entrepreneur of type a prefers
x < x′.
By contradiction, suppose that the entrepreneur prefers x ≥ x′. Then, by individual
optimality, ∫ ∞
z
πgx(π|x′)dπ ≥ R
also by the optimality of x′ at the collateralized contract (B′, z′, 1),∫ ∞
z′
πgx(π|x′)dπ −RaGx(z′|x′) = R
Combining the two conditions,∫ ∞
z
πgx(π|x′)−
∫ ∞
z′
πgx(π|x′)dπ ≥ −RaGx(z′|x′) > 0
Implying,
−
∫ z
z′
πgx(π|x′)dπ > 0
The left hand side of the latest is negative for all optimal mechanisms with a binding
incentive-compatibility constraint.24 Therefore, we achieve a contradiction.
Clearly, the two claims above are true also for SDCs.
To summarize, the introduction of collateralized contracts allows to weaken (LL) and to
redistribute the loan cost from states with high proﬁts (successful states) to those with low
proﬁts (unsuccessful or ‘bankruptcy’ states). This is illustrated graphically, for SDCs, in
ﬁgure 2. Therefore, provided that collateral does not ration the amount of funds available
24This is not immediate and follows from the optimal deﬁnition of the payment schedule and of z′ in lemma
4. For all π ≥ z′ ≥ πs, yields ϕ(π, x′, ·) ≤ 0; namely, μgx(π|x′) ≥ θ(π) ≥ 0, when μ > 0; where the inequality
for a.a. π ≥ z′.
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Figure 2. Contracts with and without down-payment
to investors, such contracts lower the implicit interest rate, raise the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts
and boost real investments.
Investment policy predictions over the cross-section of ﬁrms. Consider entrepreneurs who
subscribe collateralized SDCs in L∗ and, for expositional simplicity, refer each contract
optimally designed for entrepreneur a as contract a; the space of optimal contracts is indexed
over A := [a, a¯]. The next result establishes an important property of optimal SDC; namely,
contracts incentivate ﬁrms with higher initial capital to invest more in the ﬁrm. The reason
why this occurs is that higher capitalized ﬁrms participate in the project with an higher
down-payment (or collateral); this, according to our previous discussion (see Claims 1,2)
makes feasible for the intermediary to decrease the loan threshold z; which -for ﬁxed R-
increases the entrepreneur incentive to invest and x. Before establishing this formally, we
present a useful technical result.
Lemma 7. At any monotone SDC a in L∗,
(oo) R−
∫
P agx(π|x(a))dπ >
[
1−G(z|x(a))∫∞
z gx(z|x(a))dπ
]
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x(a)]
Proof. By contradiction, suppose that, at an optimal contract (oo) fails to hold. We are
going to prove that by, proportionally, increasing B and x and lowering z, we can increase
the value of the objective without violating (IP) and the commitment constraint (CC’).
Indeed, let dB = dx > 0 (and da′ = 0), be an arbitrarily small change. Since (IP) holds
with equality at a.a. a in L∗, diﬀerentiating and evaluating at the optimal contract, we
ﬁnd,
(o∗) dz
dx
=
R− ∫ P gx(π|x)dπ
1−G(z|x)
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which is negative when (oo) fails. We now show that our feasible adjustment dz/dx does
not violate incentives. For (CC’) to hold,
−
(
∂
∂z
∫
P gx(π|x)dπ
)
dz +
(
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x]
)
dx ≥ 0
Yielding,
dz
dx
≤
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x]∫∞
z gx(z|x)dπ
< 0
This does not contradict (o∗) iﬀ,
R− ∫ P gx(π|x)dπ
1−G(z|x) ≤
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x]∫∞
z gx(z|x)dπ
that we can rewrite as,
R−
∫
P gx(π|x)dπ ≤
[
1−G(z|x)∫∞
z gx(z|x)dπ
]
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x]
This holds because (oo) does not. Finally, it is immediate to check that an increase of x,B
and a decrease of z raise the value of the objective, delivering the desired contradiction. 
Lemma 8. The menu of optimal, monotone SDCs is characterized by an investment sched-
ule x(a) and a loan rate schedule z(a) that are, respectively, monotonically increasing and
decreasing for almost all a in {A : x(a) < x∗} and constant otherwise.
Proof. We essentially verify that the Implicit Function Theorem holds and that it delivers
the desired monotonicity properties of (z, x)(a). From (CC’) holding with equality at almost
all (a.a.) a, we ﬁnd,
(+)
dx
da
(a) =
(
∂
∂z
∫
P agx(π|x(a))dπ
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x(a)]
)
dz
da
(a) = −μ(a)
(
∂
∂z
∫
P agx(π|x(a))dπ∫
P agx(π|x(a))dπ
)
dz
da
(a)
For any feasible change dz/da, (+) measures the slope of the optimal investment schedule
on A. This is zero in the case of no-moral hazard (i.e. when the commitment constraint is
non-binding, μ(a) = 0), corresponding to eﬃcient investment x∗, for all ﬁrms, independently
of theirs initial capital. The numerator of (+) is, (
∫∞
z gx(z|x)dπ)(dz/da), evaluated at (a).
This implies that -given the capital requirements- it is individually optimal to increase
real investments for entrepreneurs with higher capitalized ﬁrms if and only if they face a
decreasing loan threshold z. Next, we prove that indeed, at any optimal, monotone SDC a,
dz/da < 0.
Recall that (IP) holds with equality at a.a. contracts in L∗. Hence, the total diﬀerential
(with respect to a, z, x,B) must be equal to zero almost everywhere (a.e.). Moreover, since
for a.a. a, the individual budget constraint balances at zero saving, dBda =
dx
da . Hence,
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passing to SDCs and using g := g(π|x(a)), for brevity,
0 =
∂
∂a
(∫
P agdπ
)
da+
∂
∂z
(∫
P agdπ
)
dz +
∂
∂x
(∫
P agdπ
)
dx−RdB
= Rda+
∂
∂z
(∫ z
0
πgdπ + z
∫ ∞
z
gdπ
)
dz +
(∫
P agx(π|x(a))dπ −R
)
dx
= R+ [1−G(z|x(a))]dz
da
+
(∫
P agx(π|x(a))dπ −R
)
dx
da
Next, using (+) into the latest expression and rearranging terms,
dz
da
(a) =
−R
1−G(z|x(a)) + (∫ P agx(π|x(a))dπ −R)(∫∞z gx(z|x(a))dπ∂2
∂x2
E[V |x(a)]
)
The right hand side of this expression is negative iﬀ the denominator is strictly positive,
which is true at a.a. optimal, monotone SDCs by lemma 7. 
3.3. Private information on ﬁrms’ initial capital. So far, we have assumed that the
regulator/principal does not observe entrepreneurs’ types. In this section, we relax this
assumption and prove that the optimal mechanism delivers a menu of contracts, in L, that
is incentive-compatible, in the sense of (IC): it induces all entrepreneurs to truthfully reveal
their types, implement their announced projects and subscribe the contracts which are de-
signed to sustain such projects. For expositional reasons, we assume that ﬁnancial contracts
are exclusive; in the sense that every entrepreneur can subscribe a single ﬁnancial contract.
Later, in remark 3.1, we explain why –at an optimal menu of contracts- entrepreneurs do
actually prefer to subscribe a single optimal contract than to shop for a portfolio of diﬀerent
contracts.
Consider contracts that require the entrepreneur who sends a message a to dispose a
down-payment of a. Clearly, under full down-payment, an entrepreneur of type a˜ can only
send messages with a ≤ a˜, which rules out the possibility that he can access to (hence
deviate to) SDCs designed for higher capitalized ﬁrms. Then, the following is true.
Proposition 2. Under private information on types in A, a.a. contracts l in L∗ are
incentive-compatible.
Proof. For any agent a˜ in A, we have to establish that he prefers to follow the behavior
prescribed by the mechanism a˜ with an expected payoﬀ ν(a˜, a˜), instead of taking an al-
ternative mechanism  	= a˜ in L∗ and use it to implement an individually optimal project
(a′(, a˜), x(, a˜)).25 Since for a type a˜ the only feasible messages are those with a ≤ a˜,
consider these deviations.
First, we show that for all  ≤ a˜, x(, a˜) = x(). Indeed, x() is feasible for type a˜ > ,
who can claim to have a ﬁrm with capital al < a˜ and implement x() = B < B + a˜− a.
This implies that x(, a˜) ≥ x(). Next, because types have the same objectives and type 
25Later, we use the notation (a′(), x()) := (a′(, ), x(, )).
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is not rationed at the optimal contract , x() is also individually optimal for a˜, implying
that a′(, a˜) = a˜− a; namely, x(, a˜) ≤ x().
Second, recall that for a.a.  in L∗, a′() = 0 and x() = B.
We are now going to exploit these two last properties of L∗ to verify that the menu of
contracts found in proposition 1 is incentive-compatible. For all a ≤ a˜ and entrepreneur a˜,
ν(a˜, a˜)− ν(a, a˜) =
∫
[π − P a˜]g(π|x)(a˜)dπ −
∫
[π − P a]g(π|x)(a, a˜)dπ −Ra−Ra′(a, a˜)
=
∫
[π − P a˜]g(π|x)(a˜)dπ −
∫
[π − P a]g(π|x)(a)dπ −R[a+ a′(a, a˜)]
=
∫
π[g(π|x)(a˜)− g(π|x)(a)]dπ −RBa˜ +RBa −Ra˜
=
∫
π[g(π|x)(a˜)− g(π|x)(a)]dπ −R(Ba˜ + a˜) +Rx(a)
=
∫
π[g(π|x)(a˜)− g(π|x)(a)]dπ −R[x(a˜)− x(a)]
This, by the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, for all a ≤ a˜, can be written as,∫ a˜
a
[(∫
πgx(π|x)()dπ −R
)
dx
da
()
]
d
For the latest to be positive, it suﬃces that for all a ≤  ≤ a˜, the argument in the square
brackets is positive. Indeed, this is true since, ﬁrst, by (CC’),∫
πgx(π|x)()dπ −R =
∫
P (π)gx(π|x)()dπ ≥ 0
with strict inequality if x() < x∗; second, for all  ≤ a¯, (dx/da) ≥ 0 by lemma 8 above,
holding with strict inequality for a.a. contracts  for which x() = x∗. Therefore, ν(a˜, a˜)−
ν(a, a˜) > 0 if x() < x∗ and is zero otherwise. 
It is interesting to remark that the introduction of private information on the initial ﬁrms’
capital does not alter the original incentive scheme provided by the optimal mechanism in
the pure moral hazard case (proposition 1). Thus, contracts retain the original properties
and deliver an interest rate schedule, (
∫
P ag(π|x)dπ/Ba)a∈L∗ , that is decreasing in the
initial ﬁrms’ capital a. This, again, proves that higher capitalized ﬁrms have better ﬁnancial
opportunities. The down payment is used here, both as an optimal incentive devise and as
an eﬃcient screening devise. The down payment increases incentives to invest, by relaxing
the limited liability, and preserves incentive-compatibility by eliminating the possibility
that agents lie on their type. In fact, because contracts for higher capitalized ﬁrms are
cheeper and oﬀer a loan of bigger size, they would certainly attract individuals with lower
capitalized ﬁrms.
Remark 3.1 (Exclusivity). In the context of our proposition 2 the optimal menu of con-
tracts is such that no entrepreneur has an incentive to subscribe multiple contracts; that is,
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the restriction that contracts are exclusive is non-binding. In fact, any entrepreneur’s de-
mand of credit ﬁnanced by a portfolio of loans (designed for lower capitalized ﬁrms), instead
of a single contract, is characterized by a higher interest rate.
4. Conclusions
In this article we propose a security-design problem of a setting in which risk-neutral
entrepreneurs sick to ﬁnance an investment project that is unobservable by risk-neutral,
outside investor/creditors. A larger investment in the ﬁrm increases its productivity by
raising the likelihood of higher realizations of future proﬁts. However, entrepreneurs may
also ﬁnd rewarding to divert ﬁrm’s funds and hide them in an asset. Since investments
are unobservable and the exact consistency of ﬁrms’ net-worth is unveriﬁable, creditors
are exposed to both moral hazard and adverse selection. Contracts can only be written
contingently on future proﬁts, which are publicly observable, and on initial down-payments,
in the form of a security deposit. We focus on contracts that are written in the best interest
of the entrepreneurs and that satisfy some canonical restrictions: limited liability and,
possibly, the monotonicity of the payment schedule the ﬁrms veriﬁable net-worth.
In this context, an optimal menu of contracts is formed by standard-debt-contracts and
a maximum down-payment. The down-payment takes either the form of collateral or that
of a capital requirement, respectively, depending on whether one we assume monotonicity
of the payment schedule. Their interest rate schedule is decreasing in the agents’ initial
capital. Therefore, higher capitalized ﬁrms access to better credit conditions. Contracts
induce no credit rationing, but typically sustain a level of productive investments that is
only second-best eﬃcient. The occurrence of agency costs has some key implications on the
entrepreneurs’ decisions. First, entrepreneurs choose a ﬁnancial structure that privileges
internal to external funds. In particular, only entrepreneurs who have an insuﬃcient initial
capital decide to borrow. These entrepreneurs are exactly those who decide to underinvest
in their ﬁrms. Second, at the optimal contracts, entrepreneurs prefer to invest in their
ﬁrms, rather than hide funds. Third, these properties of optimal contracts are robust to
the introduction of private information on entrepreneurs initial net-worth. The presence of
down-payments grants incentive-compatibility, by preventing agents to lie on their capital
and subscribe contracts designed for higher capitalized ﬁrms. Finally, our ﬁndings hold
regardless contracts are assume to be exclusive. The fact that the interest rate schedule is
decreasing in the down-payment, represents a disincentive to ﬁnance a project by entering
multiple contracts.
We have motivated our interest in this security-design problem also referring to the ‘opac-
ity’ that typically characterizes the ﬁnancial situation and decisions of small ﬁrms, repre-
senting a particularly large fraction of the non-ﬁnancial sector in most developed countries.
These ﬁrms heavily rely on bank credit and raise outside funds in the form of standard credit
lines. The interest rate conditions on credit lines are typically decreasing in the loan size,
which is highly positively correlated with ﬁrms’ dimension (in general, capital). This type
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of ﬁnancial structure has often be considered to cause ineﬃciency and underinvestment.
Instead, to some extent, our analysis questions this conclusion. A proper combination of
standard debt contracts and collateral or minimum capital requirement may constitute an
eﬃcient (in sense of second-best) corporate ﬁnance. It is so, in the presence of moral haz-
ard, essentially because standard-debt-contracts may provide entrepreneurs with a reward
scheme that is equivalent to the best equity-base one, compatible with incentives. It is
also so in the presence of adverse selection due to the positive eﬀect of down-payments in
separating ﬁrms with diﬀerent levels of initial capital.
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